fix: address high-severity security issues from review

- Use subtle.ConstantTimeCompare for static credential checks to
  prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Cap failCounts (100k) and rememberedCreds (10k) maps with eviction
  to prevent memory exhaustion from botnet-scale scanning
- Sweep expired credentials on each auth attempt
- Add configurable max_connections (default 500) with semaphore to
  limit concurrent connections and prevent goroutine/fd exhaustion

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -1,12 +1,18 @@
 package auth
 
 import (
+	"crypto/subtle"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	"git.t-juice.club/torjus/oubliette/internal/config"
 )
 
+const (
+	maxFailCountEntries      = 100000
+	maxRememberedCredentials = 10000
+)
+
 type credKey struct {
 	Username string
 	Password string
@@ -38,9 +44,11 @@ func (a *Authenticator) Authenticate(ip, username, password string) Decision {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 
-	// 1. Check static credentials.
+	// 1. Check static credentials (constant-time comparison).
 	for _, cred := range a.cfg.StaticCredentials {
-		if cred.Username == username && cred.Password == password {
+		uMatch := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cred.Username), []byte(username))
+		pMatch := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cred.Password), []byte(password))
+		if uMatch == 1 && pMatch == 1 {
 			a.failCounts[ip] = 0
 			return Decision{Accepted: true, Reason: "static_credential"}
 		}
@@ -57,6 +65,7 @@ func (a *Authenticator) Authenticate(ip, username, password string) Decision {
 	}
 
 	// 3. Increment fail count, check threshold.
+	a.evictIfNeeded()
 	a.failCounts[ip]++
 	if a.failCounts[ip] >= a.cfg.AcceptAfter {
 		a.failCounts[ip] = 0
@@ -66,3 +75,32 @@ func (a *Authenticator) Authenticate(ip, username, password string) Decision {
 
 	return Decision{Accepted: false, Reason: "rejected"}
 }
+
+// evictIfNeeded removes stale entries when maps exceed their size limits.
+// Must be called with a.mu held.
+func (a *Authenticator) evictIfNeeded() {
+	now := a.now()
+
+	// Sweep expired remembered credentials.
+	for k, expiry := range a.rememberedCreds {
+		if now.After(expiry) {
+			delete(a.rememberedCreds, k)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If remembered creds still over limit, drop oldest entries.
+	for len(a.rememberedCreds) > maxRememberedCredentials {
+		for k := range a.rememberedCreds {
+			delete(a.rememberedCreds, k)
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If fail counts over limit, drop arbitrary entries.
+	for len(a.failCounts) > maxFailCountEntries {
+		for k := range a.failCounts {
+			delete(a.failCounts, k)
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package auth
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -127,6 +128,31 @@ func TestCounterResetsAfterAcceptance(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestExpiredCredentialsSweep(t *testing.T) {
+	a := newTestAuth(2, time.Hour)
+	now := time.Now()
+	a.now = func() time.Time { return now }
+
+	// Create several remembered credentials by reaching the threshold.
+	for i := range 5 {
+		ip := fmt.Sprintf("10.0.0.%d", i)
+		a.Authenticate(ip, fmt.Sprintf("user%d", i), "pass")
+		a.Authenticate(ip, fmt.Sprintf("user%d", i), "pass")
+	}
+
+	if len(a.rememberedCreds) != 5 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 5 remembered creds, got %d", len(a.rememberedCreds))
+	}
+
+	// Advance past TTL so all are expired, then trigger sweep.
+	a.now = func() time.Time { return now.Add(2 * time.Hour) }
+	a.Authenticate("99.99.99.99", "trigger", "sweep")
+
+	if len(a.rememberedCreds) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 0 remembered creds after sweep, got %d", len(a.rememberedCreds))
+	}
+}
+
 func TestConcurrentAccess(t *testing.T) {
 	a := newTestAuth(5, time.Hour)
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup

internal/config/config.go

@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ type Config struct {
 }
 
 type SSHConfig struct {
-	ListenAddr  string `toml:"listen_addr"`
-	HostKeyPath string `toml:"host_key_path"`
+	ListenAddr     string `toml:"listen_addr"`
+	HostKeyPath    string `toml:"host_key_path"`
+	MaxConnections int    `toml:"max_connections"`
 }
 
 type AuthConfig struct {
@@ -60,6 +61,9 @@ func applyDefaults(cfg *Config) {
 	if cfg.SSH.HostKeyPath == "" {
 		cfg.SSH.HostKeyPath = "oubliette_host_key"
 	}
+	if cfg.SSH.MaxConnections == 0 {
+		cfg.SSH.MaxConnections = 500
+	}
 	if cfg.Auth.AcceptAfter == 0 {
 		cfg.Auth.AcceptAfter = 10
 	}

internal/server/server.go

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	authenticator *auth.Authenticator
 	sshConfig     *ssh.ServerConfig
 	logger        *slog.Logger
+	connSem       chan struct{} // semaphore limiting concurrent connections
 }
 
 func New(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) (*Server, error) {
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ func New(cfg config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) (*Server, error) {
 		cfg:           cfg,
 		authenticator: auth.NewAuthenticator(cfg.Auth),
 		logger:        logger,
+		connSem:       make(chan struct{}, cfg.SSH.MaxConnections),
 	}
 
 	hostKey, err := loadOrGenerateHostKey(cfg.SSH.HostKeyPath)
@@ -70,7 +72,18 @@ func (s *Server) ListenAndServe(ctx context.Context) error {
 			s.logger.Error("accept error", "err", err)
 			continue
 		}
-		go s.handleConn(conn)
+
+		// Enforce max concurrent connections.
+		select {
+		case s.connSem <- struct{}{}:
+			go func() {
+				defer func() { <-s.connSem }()
+				s.handleConn(conn)
+			}()
+		default:
+			s.logger.Warn("max connections reached, rejecting", "remote_addr", conn.RemoteAddr())
+			conn.Close()
+		}
 	}
 }
 

internal/server/server_test.go

@@ -97,8 +97,9 @@ func TestIntegrationSSHConnect(t *testing.T) {
 	tmpDir := t.TempDir()
 	cfg := config.Config{
 		SSH: config.SSHConfig{
-			ListenAddr:  "127.0.0.1:0",
-			HostKeyPath: filepath.Join(tmpDir, "host_key"),
+			ListenAddr:     "127.0.0.1:0",
+			HostKeyPath:    filepath.Join(tmpDir, "host_key"),
+			MaxConnections: 100,
 		},
 		Auth: config.AuthConfig{
 			AcceptAfter:       2,