6.3 KiB
Magicman: PS/2 Keyboard Broken at LUKS Prompt After BIOS Update
Issue
After updating the ThinkPad L14 Gen 4 (21H2S3US00) BIOS to version R24ET51W (1.34)
via fwupdmgr, the built-in laptop keyboard no longer works during the LUKS disk
encryption password prompt. An external USB keyboard must be used to unlock the disk.
The laptop keyboard works normally after boot.
Machine Details
- Model: Lenovo ThinkPad L14 Gen 4 (21H2S3US00)
- BIOS: R24ET51W (1.34), dated 2025-10-31
- EC: R24HT33W
- Date: 2026-03-06
What fwupdmgr Installed
- System Firmware: 0.1.12 → 0.1.34
- UEFI dbx: 20230301 → 20250902
- KEK CA: 2011 → 2023
Symptoms
- Laptop keyboard does not respond at the LUKS password prompt (neither systemd nor scripted initrd)
- USB keyboard works fine at the LUKS prompt
- Laptop keyboard works immediately after boot (at greetd login)
- Text typed on the laptop keyboard during LUKS prompt sometimes partially appears at the greetd username field after boot, indicating the keyboard hardware IS generating scancodes that get buffered and flushed later
Kernel Errors
Every boot shows these errors from the atkbd driver:
atkbd serio0: Failed to deactivate keyboard on isa0060/serio0
atkbd serio0: Failed to enable keyboard on isa0060/serio0
input: AT Translated Set 2 keyboard as /devices/platform/i8042/serio0/input/input0
atkbd serio0: Spurious ACK on isa0060/serio0. Some program might be trying to access hardware directly.
The keyboard device IS registered despite the errors, and the kbd input handler
binds to it (Handlers=sysrq kbd leds event6).
Root Cause Analysis
The BIOS update changed the PS/2 controller (i8042) initialization behavior. The atkbd driver sends a deactivate command (0xF5) during init, which likely succeeds at disabling the keyboard even though the ACK times out. The subsequent enable command (0xF4) also times out without re-enabling it. The keyboard stays disabled at the hardware level — it queues keypresses in its small internal buffer (~16 keys) but doesn't send scancodes to the host until something re-enables it during full boot. This is NOT a timing issue — leaving the system at the LUKS prompt for several minutes does not fix the keyboard. Something specific that happens later in the boot process (likely during switch-root when udev re-processes devices) re-enables the keyboard.
What Was Tried
Kernel Parameters (none helped)
i8042.dumbkbd— skip keyboard reset during i8042 probei8042.nopnp— don't use PNP to discover controllersi8042.reset— force i8042 controller reseti8042.nomux— don't probe for MUXatkbd.reset— reset keyboard during atkbd initconsole=tty1— explicitly route console I/O to tty1- Various combinations of the above
Initrd Module Loading
- Added
i8042,atkbd,thinkpad_acpitoboot.initrd.kernelModules thinkpad_acpiloads the EC driver early, but didn't help
Initrd Services
- Created
keyboard-reconnectsystemd service that runs beforesystemd-cryptsetup@root.service - Tried
echo reconnect > /sys/bus/serio/devices/serio0/drvctl— reconnect also fails - Tried full module reload:
rmmod atkbd; rmmod i8042; sleep N; modprobe i8042; modprobe atkbd- Tested with sleep 2 and sleep 8
- The reload creates a new serio device (serio2) but initialization fails identically
Plymouth
- Disabled Plymouth (
boot.plymouth.enable = false) — no effect - Tested
plymouth.enable=0on kernel command line — no effect - Confirmed password agent falls back to
systemd-tty-ask-password-agenton/dev/tty1
Scripted Initrd
- Switched from systemd initrd to scripted initrd (
boot.initrd.systemd.enable = false) - Uses a completely different password prompt mechanism (shell
read) - Same result — keyboard still doesn't work
BIOS
- Checked BIOS settings — no relevant keyboard/PS/2 options available
fwupdmgr get-updatesshows no newer BIOS version available
Planned Fix: TPM + Secure Boot Auto-Unlock
Approach
Use TPM2-based LUKS unlock with Secure Boot to bypass the keyboard requirement entirely.
- lanzaboote — replaces systemd-boot, produces signed Unified Kernel Images (UKIs) that bundle kernel + initrd + cmdline into a single signed EFI binary
- Secure Boot — ensures only signed code can boot, prevents tampering with boot chain
- TPM2 unlock —
systemd-cryptenrollbinds LUKS key to TPM PCR 7 (Secure Boot policy) - Passphrase kept as fallback — if TPM/Secure Boot state changes, unlock with USB keyboard + password
Why PCR 7 Only
Binding to PCR 7 alone means kernel/initrd updates (frequent on nixos-unstable) do NOT require re-enrollment. PCR 7 only changes when Secure Boot keys or policy change.
Cmdline tampering is prevented by lanzaboote's UKI approach — the cmdline is embedded in the signed binary and cannot be edited at the bootloader.
Setup Steps
- Install
sbctland create Secure Boot signing keys - Put BIOS into Secure Boot "Setup Mode" and enroll custom keys (include Microsoft keys for fwupd)
- Enable lanzaboote in NixOS config (replaces systemd-boot)
- Rebuild, verify Secure Boot works
- Enroll TPM with
systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=7
After setup, nixos-rebuild switch/boot works as usual — lanzaboote automatically signs
each new generation.
Security Considerations
Protected against:
- Offline disk read (pull SSD, boot USB)
- Boot chain tampering (unsigned code won't boot)
- Cmdline editing (locked into signed UKI)
Remaining attack surface:
- Stolen while suspended — disk is decrypted in RAM, only screen lock protects. Consider hibernate instead of suspend (hibernate locks LUKS since RAM is powered off).
- Network services — system is fully running after boot, exposed services are reachable
- DMA attacks via Thunderbolt/PCIe — mitigated by IOMMU (should be on by default)
- Cold boot attacks — exotic, requires freezing RAM
For a stolen-laptop scenario this is solid. The biggest practical risk is theft while the laptop is suspended.
Other Considered Alternatives
- BIOS update from Lenovo fixing the PS/2 controller init sequence
- Kernel patch to handle the failed enable more gracefully
- TPM + PIN — not viable due to the same PS/2 keyboard issue at the PIN prompt
Current Workaround
Use an external USB keyboard to enter the LUKS password at boot.